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ABSTRACT
Concepts commonly found in ASW search are used to model the flow
and detection of mobile launchers for short range ballistic missiles.
Emphasis is on detection and destruction of the launcher before
launch. The benefit of pre-hostility intelligence and pre-missile-
launch prosecution, the backbone of successful ASW, is revealed
through the analysis of a circulation model which reflects the stan-
dard operations of a third world mobile missile launcher during hos-
tilities. A decision model is constructed and analyzed to give insight








As evidenced by the Persian Gulf War, the short range ballistic mis-
sile (SRBM) is a highly effective political weapon even when its direct military ef-
fectiveness is, as in the case of the non-guided SCUD missile used by Iraq,
relatively low (Ref. [1]). Public fears and possible political repercussions created
by SCUD missile launches forced the Allies to divert a significant percentage of
air sorties, previously scheduled for other missions, to hunt for both fixed launch
sites and mobile launchers. The degree to which the Iraqi government measured
the success of their SRBM force is thought to be based largely on the capability
of continuous SCUD missile launches throughout the war, independent of
whether the intended target was destroyed or not. By this measure the mission
was highly successful.
The scramble to destroy the mobile SRBM launchers became head-
line news as the war proceeded and a number of SCUD missiles penetrated the
air defenses of the Coalition; a few reached their targets inside Israel and Saudi
Arabia. The speculation that Iraq might use chemical warheads on its missiles
increased the urgency of the launcher destroy mission. One can assume that
other potential third world adversaries noted the success of Iraq's mobile missile
force and might view them as an effective weapon system in which to invest. The
threat appears to be increasing and will probably become more accurate and le-
thal with time.
This report proposes a basic model that captures the important as-
pects of the mobile SRI3M counter effort. Emphasis is placed on prosecuting the
mobile launchers themselves. The current counter effort focus is briefly de-
scribed and possible shortcomings are pointed out. A restructuring of the current
imobile launcher counter effort is proposed using the general principles that have
been effective in anti-submarine warfare. The benefits of. and policy development
for. prosecuting the mobile launchers prior to missile lautch are stressed.
The following sections provide a partial answer to solving the mobile
SRBM counter effort. They raise questions concerning the actual hardware. tac-
tics. and intelligence requirements by modeling the counter effort as a decision
analysis problem. Included in the model is the ability to make trade-offs among
mcthods of countering the third world mobile SRBM threat.
Section 2 argues the case for requiring pre-missile-launch and pre--
hostility tactics against mobile launchers to counter the SRBM threat. Section 3
describes a circulation model based on launcher transits between forward re-
plenishment points and launch areas. From this model we derive expressions for
a number of r •-rformance meAsurements, including the expected number of mis-
siles launched and the expected number that will reach their target area, in
terms of critical model parameters. Included are numerical and graphical exam-
ples. Secuon 4 describes a decision model constructed to reflect the major events
and deci;ons that must be made with respect to mobile missile launchers lead-
ing up to the outbreak of hostilities with a likely adversary. Optimal policies are
derived in terms of model parameters, and examples are given. Section 5 com-
bines te circulation model of Section 3 with the decision model of Section 4. and
presents a methodology to determine optimal policies to counter the mobile
launchers. Section 6 contains concluding remarks and a recommendation for
further work.
2. The Mobile SRBM Counter Effort
The ntssion of defeoting or significantly suppressing the mobile
SRBM threat is difficult. Post Desert Storm )l '-',." have revised downward the
optimistic war time battle damage as-cssment (BDA) of a significant percenta e
of mobile launchers destroyed (Ref. 12!). Some reports have indicated numbers
close to zero for the estimated number destroyed during the conflict. The effec-
tiveness of the PATRIOT system in defeaing incoming missiles is also unlder de-
bate. All reports agree that the inclusive counter effort failed to produce results
that normally indicate mission success.
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2.1 An Integrated Approach
Current research and development to counter the mobile SRBM
threat is focused primarily on post-missile-launch hardware and tactics to
counter both the missiles and the mobile launchers (Ref. [31). Air defense sys-
tems such as PATRIOT are being designed to kill incoming missiles. Weapon sys-
tems are being developed to allow for greater success in the prosecution of
launchers after missile launch cuing data is received, referred to in this thesis as
the flaming datum tactic. These approaches assume that the mobile SRBM prob-
lem begins after missile launch. This report focuses on the benefits and policy
development of prosecuting the mobile launchers themselves prior to both mis-
sile launch and hostilities.
The analyst familiar with the general principles of anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) find the poor results of the counter effort to suppress mobile
SCUD launcher activity during the Persian Gulf War to be no surprise. An effec-
tive counter effort against a highly elusive target such as a mobile missile launch-
er or a submarine, should not begin after weapon release, as is the current focus
with the SRBM. but well before the threat is in the position to do so. This section
introduces the concept of using search tactics prior to missile laudch as well as
pre-ho3tility intelligence effort in countering the mobile launcher, and suggests
using an existing structure to create an effective counter effort doctrine.
2.2 Anti-Submarine Warfare and SCUD Hunting
The capability to detect, track, classify, and if needed, destroy an en-
emy submarine has increased dramatically over the last half centuiy, A Second
World War air crewman, while visually (and later with the help of radar) search-
ing the thousands of square miles of the Bay of Biscay for Gernan U-boats.
would have dismissed as impossible the idea of one day passively tracking a sub-
marine while ii is submerged. Today. this is conmnonplace. The ASW community
has been effectively searching for increasingly invisible targets for many years:
the lessons have already been learned and, in many cases, can be adapted to
counter mobile missile launchers.
The general principles that provide the structure for the current
ASW doctrine have been developed through theory and tested by experience as
the submarine gained in capability and stealth sophistication. Although the spe-
cific tactics and hardware will be different, many of these principles that have
brought success to ASW apply directly to countering mobile missile launchers.
LUsted below is Just a sampling of ASW principles that require consideration,
each with a brief statement relating them to the mobile SRBM problem.
a) Strong community identification. Like ASW. the mobile SRBM
counter effort requires a dedicated integrated community that is
committed to defeating the threat. The predicted diversity of such an
effort (possibly from special force units on the ground to satellites in
space) will place a need for a strong community identification with a
defined focal point for all aspects of the counter effort.
b) Intense scrutiny of enemy signatures. Every possible signature.
ranging from the obvious (infrared. electromagnetic, etc.) to the not
so obvious (seismic, aural, tire patterns. etc.) needs careful exami-
nation for potential exploitation. Signatures play a crucial role in
both detection and classification of targets.
e) Understanding enemy tactics.The ability to predict or estimate
the actions of the enemy mobile launcher force is invaluable in de-
veloping tactics for specific situations.
d) Environment considerations. The environment of the counter
effort will change from enemy to enemy, country to country. Future
conflicts may not all be fought in a desert environment, as was the
Persian Gulf War.
e) Heavy emphasis on intelligence. Mobile launcher search with-
out intelligence is much like a needle search in one of many hay-
stacks. Intelligence (HUMINT. ELINT. etc.) can narrow the search to
a single haystack. effectively giving the search effort a starting point.
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f) Localization capabilities on many platforms. The more plat-
forms with the capability to localize a target the better. This increas-
es the probability of a capable unit being in the vicinity of a reported
datum and giving the potential target little or no time to evade.
g) Integrated weapon and sensor platforms. This extends the last
principle to target destruction. It Is optimal for the same platform
that localizes the threat to be capable of classification and destruc-
tion. This avoids potential time delays and communication failures
associated with calling in an attack.
h) Large area search capabilities on a continuous basis. The ca-
pability to conduct continuous search of large areas is required to
gain initial detection on possible targets. The system conducting the
search must then be capable of providing a real time datum to a plat-
form capable of target localization, classification, and destruction.
i) Base watch and choke point tactics. Intelligence effort focused
on the locating and subsequent watching of launcher storage bases
is vital to determine weapon mobilization and estimating enemy or-
der of battle. A choke point can be thought of as an easily searched
area v 'here a target should pass through, usually due to geographic
constraints, to get from point A to point B. For mobile launchers.
this definition is simply extended to include paths of least resis-
tance; highways and bridges, for example.
J) Tracking of all known threats at all times. Once a mobile
launcher is detected and classified, there nmust be the capability to
continue tracking until either hostilities erupt and it can be de-
stroyed or it is no longer considered a threat.
k) Well exercised, coordinated prosecution. An optimal counter
elfort must combine the capabilities of all services as well as those
of our Allies. Joint and NATO exercises are required to ensure all
participants involved witLh the effort are in concert with each other.
1) Quick and successful response to reported datum. This encom-
passes many of the above principles. Once intelligence is received on
a possible target. a capable platform must arrive expcditiously at da-
tum and perform effective localization.
-5
The mobile SRBM counter effort is still in its infancy. It should be
thought of in broad terms, not simply as a science and/or engineering problem.
The effort, like ASW, is multi-faceted and will need a broad array of disciplines
including tactical modeling. risk analysis and decision modeling in addition to
science and engineering. The general principles of ASW should be used as a basic
structure, or guideline, to ensure the effort is focused in the direction to optimally
counter the threat.
Many of the principles listed in this section involve or imply the pros-
ecution of mobile launchers prior to receiving cuing data from a missile launch.
The next section points out the benefits to be gained through the inclusion of
both pre-launch search tactics and pre-hostility intelligence in the mobile
launcher counter effort doctrine through the analysis of a circulation model.
3. A Launcher Circulation Model
The following simple model shows the potential benefits of prosecut-
ing the mobile launchers prior to missile launch. Figure 1 shows a circulation
model which approximates the general flow of an enemy mobile missile launcher
during mobilization and hostilitics.During peacetime. the mobile launchers are
kept at storage bases. As with all weapon systems, it is assumed the launchers
deploy during peacetime for the general upkeep of the systems and pi uiciencv
training for the crews, but eventually return to storage. As the possibility of war
increases, the launchers are deployed, either individually or in groups. to forward
replenishment bases to await firing instructions. As hostilities erupt. the individ-
ual mobile launchers begin a cycle which carries them from the forward replen-
ishment base to a designated launch area. and back to the replenishment 1, -e
for re-anrament and further instructions.
A probability of survival (avoiding destruction) for the launchers can
be assigned to each leg of the cycle, represented by q1 and q2 in Figure 1. This









Figure 1: Mobile SRBM Launcher Circulation Modet
no upper bound on the supply of missiles). Although a model such as this is sim-
ple in both construction and nature, broad insight can be gahied through its
analysis.
The model In Figure 1 resembles a simple circulation model devel-
oped and analyzed by the Center for t, wal Analyses (CNA) in 1969 (Ref. 141). The
CN•A model was developed to study an idealized. steady state anti-shipping camn-
paign carried out by independently operating submarines. The CNA analysis cen-
tered on the scenario where the probability of survival of a submarine on its
transit to a patrol area is equal to the probability of survival for the transit home
(qI=q2). Since a su.mrazine is vulnerable to essentially the same ASW search and
detection tactics on both transit legs. this is a reasonable assumption. In the
case of a laobile missile launcher. however, very different tactics must be used
on the outbound and return trmasits. On the return trwasit, the primary detec-
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tion data comes from the flaming datum of the missile latnch to locate the
launchers position. On the outbound leg. pre-nostility intelligence data to predict
launcher locations and pre-missile-launch search tactics must be relied upon for
initial detection. Without such information, the survival probability on the out-
bound leg. qj, would be very close to 1.0. After initial detection by whatever
means, the localization, classification, and destruction probabilities of both legs
are assumed equal (same prosecution tactics applied).
We extend the analysis in Ref. 141 to a more realistic model for 0.
mobile launcher problem, where the probabilities q, and q2 are not equal. Spe-
cifically. we focus on determining the effect on the expected number of missile
launches of reducing q, from its current value of approximately 1.0. Due to the
excellent cuing data provided for initial detection by a missile launch, it is as-
sumed q1 ->q2.
Let a successful cycle by a mobile launcher be defined as surviving
the transit to the launch area and the launch of a missile. All launchers are as-
sumed to begin the cycle at a forward replenishment base. This implies that the
first cycle is defined as the transit from this base to the launch area. All subse-
quent cycles are defined as surviving the transit from the launch area to the for-
ward base. and back to the launch area. Of specific interest are the following:
(i0 "le probability distribution of the number of successful cycles
completed by a launcher before being killed, and its expected value.
(i) Tlhe probability distribution of the total number of missile launch-
es by all mobile launchers in a conflict, and its expected value.
3.1 Circulation Model Analysis
The following rotation is used:
n = estimated total number of enemy mobile launchers.
C, number of successful cycles per mobile launcher i (random vari-
able).
q, = Pr(mobile launcher survives transit from the forward base
to launch area and launches missile).
q2 = Pr{launcher survives transit from launch area to forward base).
The probability distribution of CO is geometric in nature. It fires no
missiles if it is destroyed on its first transit from Forward Replenishment (FR) to
Launch Area (LA). For i>0 it launches i missiles if it is not destroyed on the first
transit from FR to LA. nor on any of the next (i-1) cycles starting at LA, and is
destroyed on the next cycle. Thus
Pr{Cj=n =I q, if n=0,
= q1(qlq 2)i-'(1 - qjq2) if n = 1,2,3,....
The expected value of Ci is
-'E[Ci] = qj/(l - qjq2) (I)
and the variance is
Var(C1) = [ql-q, 2(l-q 2)I/(l - qlq 2)2. (2)
A mobile launcher has a very limited field reload capability, especial-
ly in a hostile environment. Although on a given cycle it is possible to reload and
fire more than one missile this is not observed to occur in practise. We therefore
assume that on each cycle a launcher attempts at most one launch. It follows
that the expected number of missile launches by launcher i before destruction
will equal the expected number of cycles the launcher survives. Figure 2 shows
a plot of the expected number of missile launches by launcher i as a function of
q2 with q, held constant at various feasible values (1, 0.95. 0.9, 0.85). The inter-
pretation of the plot follows shortly.
Define the random variable R as the total missile launches by all n
mobile launchers during a conflict, so
4 n
R= X0 1 .
1=1
12 Outward Survival Probability, q1 = 1
Q 0.95
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Figure 2: Expected Missiles Launched per Launcher
_ ~From Equation (1) the expected total missile launches by all mobile launchers in
_ •_ a conflict is
_E[RI nq1 /(l - qlqj). (3)
_- This model assumes an extended conflict where the probability of
launcher survival on each leg remains the same for every cycle, each cycle is in-
=- dependent of the others, and no upper limit on the supply of enemy missiles.
Hence, the model results can be looked upon as an upper bound on expected
missile launches during a conflict.
I0
3.2 Circulation Model Results
An important result of our analysis of the circulation model is dis-
played in Figure 2. As mentioned earlier, the current emphasis of the mobile
launcher counter effort is on the flaming datum tactic. Little attention has been
given to the importance of pre-missile-launch data gathering and prosecution,
Without such actions, it is reasonable to assume that ql would be approximately
equal to 1. Referring to the q1=1.0 curve in FIgure 2, it is seen as q2 increases
above about 0.6. the expected number of launches by launcher i begins to in-
crease geometrically. A simple interpretation of this is, if the flaming datum tactic
is unable to obtain a probability of mobile launcher kill of at least 0.4, the expect-
ed number of missile launches may be unacceptably high. As q! decreases due
to pre-launch tactics and pre-hostility intelligence, the critical q2 value hncreases,
and the maximum expected missile launches decrease considerably. For exam-
ple, for q2=0.9 reducing q, from 1.0 to 0.85 reduces the expected missiles
launched per launcher from 10.0 to 3.6, or approximately two thirds.
In a conflict such as the Persian Gulf War, a short range ballistic
missile launched by a third world country need not reach its intended target for
mission success. The mere launch of the weapon can be a political victory for the
enemy. spreading terror through targeted friendly populations and governments.
Air defense systems of the future are predicted to have no greater than 90% effi-
ciency in defeating incoming missiles, leaving up to 10% of those launched to
reach their destination without interception. Therefore it is also of interest to ex-
amine the effect of pre-missile launch effort on the expected number of missiles
that penetrate the air defense system. Thiis is the focus of the following subsec-
tion.
3.3 Model Parameter Effects
After launch, each missile is subject to interception by an air defense
network (PATRIOT, for example) that attempts to deitroy the missile prior to
reaching its targeted area. Assumihig that missile destructions are independent
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events (destruction of a missile tells us nothing about the likelihood of destruc-
tion of any other missile) they can be modeled as Bernoulli trials. Let X)=I if a
missilej is not destroyed, Xj=O if it is, and let Pr{Xj=l1=q3 (see Figure 1). The total
number of missiles from launcher i not destroyed will be the sum of these Xj's
where j ranges from 1 to Ci. if Si is the number of missiles launched from launch-
er i that are not destroyed by the air defense network, the probability distribution
for S,. given Ci, is binomial with parameters Ci and q3. Thus
E[Sj I C] = Ciq 3 and Var(Si I C) = Ciq 3(1-q3).
To find E[Si] and Var(S1) we need to remove the condition on Ci using the theory
of conditional probabilty. The results are
E[S11 = qlq3/(l-qlq 2) (4)
and
Var (S,) qq 3 (1 - q, q2 + 2qq 2q3 - qq 3) (5)(I -qlq 2 )
Finally let the random varlaiule T represent the total number of enemy missiles
which successfully penetrate the axr cefense network and reach their targeted




the expected value of T is n tinits the expression in Equation (4).
E[T] = nqlq3/(l-q,q 2), (6)
If we assume that there Is no conrelation among the S's the variance of T is n
times the expression in Equation %5).
Equation (6) shows thc feasible options available to reduce the ex-
pected number of missiles that penetrate and reach their targeted area. They are:
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(i) reducing n through pre-hostility intelligence/interdiction effort,
(ii) reducing q3 through upgrading air defense systems such as PA-
TRIOT,
(iii) reducing q, through pre-launch search and destroy tactics,
(iv) reducing q2 through increasing the success rate of the flaming
datum tactic.
Note that E[Tj is linear in q3, but geometric in both ql and q2.Thus one can expect
far higher payoff from a reduction in either of the latter two parameters compared
to q3. It is better to destroy the bow than try to shoot down the arrows in flight.
Table 1 demonstrates this by showing the expected number of missiles that sur-





.5 .7 .9 .5 .7 .9 .5 .7 .9
1.0 20 33 100 60 100 300 100 167 500
.9 16 24 47 49 73 142 82 121 236
.8 13 20 40 61 66 102
.7 11 19 32 59 53 98
.6 9 26 43
• 5 7 20 33
Table 1: Expected Number Of Missiles Reaching Target Area
that we assume q ->q2 so that some of the cells are empty. We also assume that
the initial number of launchers. n. is 100. Three values of q3, the missile survival
probability, are listed across the second row of the table. For each q3 , three val-
ues of q2. the launcher return transit survival probability. are listed in the third
row. Six values ofq 1, the outbound launcher survival probability, from 1.0 to 0.5.
are listed down the first colunmn.
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Examining the row of Table 1 that corresponds to q1= 1.0 gives E[T]
values for various combinations of q2 and q3. The value of pre-launch tactics and
pre-hostility intelligence effort, especially in cases of both q2 and q3 being large,
can be seen by examining the rows corresponding to reduced values of qj. Even
a small reduction of q, to 0.9, in cases where q2 also equals 0.9 (under any value
of q3), results in a greater than 50% reduction in E[TMI
Table 1 can also be used to determine the probabilities required to
obt, in a determined acceptable level of missile hits. For example, the shaded
cells in Table 1 show different combinations of parameters that yield an expected
number of missile hits of approximately 30. The analyst and decision maker can
then determine which combination of probabilities is the most feasible and cost
effective to achieve in order to obtain the desired EITI.
Many of the principles that have led to success in ASW include pre--
hostility intelligence effort. As mentioned in this section, this is often a sensitive
option and its use must be carefully planned and based on informed decisions
only. The focus of Section 4 is on the development of a decision model to gain
insight into the determination of pre-hostility intelligence gathering policies. It is
showrn how these depend on estimates of hostilities occurring relative to the ra-
tion of expected missiles launched under differing conditions. Section 5 ties to-
gether the circulation model results with the decision model results to help the
decision maker understand the effect of resource allocation before hostilities
commence.
4. The Pre-Hostilities Decision Model
Having formulated the circulation model in Section 3 it is not obvi-
ous how its results apply in a given situation. The United States does not have
the resources to monitor all possible areas where mobile missile launchers may
be deployed. The decision to expend resources in a gýven area before any hostil-
ities break out. the level of resource allocation, and the methods of employing it.
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all must depend on the likelihood of hostilities in the area that would affect US
national interests. The purpose of this section is to present methods and models
intended to aid a decision maker better understand the trade-offs and risks in-
volved. The overall problem is complex, and the models presented here are
intended to show the basic structure. Influence diagrams and decision trees are
the tools used to help formulate and analyze the problem.
4.1 Problem Structure
The first assumption made is that the path to hostilities follows the
three stages of peacetime, mobilization, hostile action. The second assumption is
that two distinct decisions must be made. The first is whether or not to gather
intelligence in peacetime, and how to carry this out. The second is what action
to take against the mobile missile launchers during mobilization. In this report
it is assumed that if hostiles occur the US would be involved' in reducing the ex-
pected number of SRBM's launched against friendly nations to a minimum.
Let D, be the set of alternatives available to the decision maker dur-
ing peacetime with elements dlr D1 . We assume that it consists of three ele-
ments:
d, - 0 if no action is taken to gain intelligence,
d, = 1 if covert intelligence effort is undertaken.
d I = 2 if overt intelligence effort is undertaken.
Let D2 be the set of decisions available during mobilization with elements d2 F D2 .
We assume that it consists of three elements:
d2 = 0 if no action is taken to gain intelligence
d2 = 1 if overt intelligence eflbrt is undertaken.
d 2 = 2 if interdiction of mobile launchers is undertaken.
1. The political questions of possible coalition involvement are not relevant to this repon1
Our obj.-tive is to model the effects of pre-hostilnles intelligence gathering on a possfille
future conflict.
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It is a model assumption that interdiction at the mobilization decision stage is an
option only if there has been intelligence performed during peacetime. Interdic-
tion can take many forms. At this stage we do not specify how it is carried out,
but simply assume that it will result in a lowering of the expected numbers of
missiles launched.
Whichever decision is made during peacetime, the enemy decision to
mobilizes is uncertain. Let M =1 if the enemy mobilizes and 0 if it does not. In-
herent in this definition is the concept of a time period, say for example, a year.
If mobilization does occur during the year, M= 1. Otherwise it is zero and the de-
cision problem can be repeated in the next period. The distribution of M is as-
sumed to depend on the first decision with
Pr{M=1 I dj=i} =m, ifi = 0,l,
Pr{M= 1 d =2 = nM2.
Similarly, whichever decision is made during mobilization, the ene-
my decision to start hostilities is uncertain. Let H be a Bernoulli random variable
that is 1 if hostilities break out and 0 if they do not. The distribution of H is as-
sumed to depend on both decisions and on M with
Pr{H= 1IdI=0, M=1. d 2=O) = hl.
Pr{H=I Idi=i. M=l, d2=2) = h 2 if i = 0,1,2.
We assume that if d2=3 (interdiction after observing mobilization) hostilities are
assumed to have broken out, or H= 1 with probability I.
Let R be the set of possible results of the decision process with ele-
ments rr IR. An element r represents the expected number of SRBM's launched.
Clearly this will depend on the decisions made and on the behavior of the enemy.
Let
r = 0 if hostilities do not break out.
r = r, if no intelligence effort is applied during peacetime or mobili-
zation and hostilities break out.
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r = r2 if no intelligence effort is applied during peacetime but is car-
ried out covertly during mobilization, and hostilities break out,
r = r3 if covert intelligence effort is applied during both peacetime
and mobilization, and hostilities break out,
r = r4 if overt intelligence effort is applied during both peacetime and
mobilization, and hostilities break out.
r = r5 if covert or overt intelligence effort is applied during peacetime
and launcher interdiction is undertaken during mobilization.
Figure 3 shows the structure of the decision problem in an influence diagram.






Figure 3:Influence Diagram for the Decision Problem
sible interactions among the events. The first event is the decision dI (decisions
are depicted with square nodes) as to the type. if any, of intelligence gathering to
undertake in peacetime. The next event is M, whether or not the enemy mobilizes
(uncertain events are depicted by circles). This is followed by the mobilization de-
cision d2. then the observation of whether or not hostilities break out. H. and fi-
nally the result r is observed (shown as a diamnond node).
Directed arcs between nodes imply possible dependence. Consider
the three arcs leaving dI. The one ,-hat ends at d2 indicates that the mobilization
decision can be affected by the peacetime decision. For example, if the peacetime
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decision is not to undertake intelligence gathering (d, = 0). the mobilization de-
cision cannot be interdiction since we have no knowledge of the whereabouts of
the missile launchers. If the peacetime decision is overt intelligence gathering
(d I = 2) the overt character of these efforts may affect the enemy's decision to mo-
bilize (change the distribution of H). If the peacetime decision is covert intelli-
gence gathering (dI = 1) since these efforts would be unknown to the enemy they
cannot affect H or M.2 The arc from M to d2 shows that the enemy mobilization
decision is known before the US decision on intelligence gathering in this period
is made. The arc from M to H shows that these random events are dependent.
The arc from d2 to H indicates the dependence of H on d2. Finally, once d2 has
been made and the outcome of H is known (H=1 if hostilities break out, 0 if not),
the resulting expected number of SRBM's launched is known.
The decision tree for this problem is shown in Figure 6. The se-
quence of the nodes follows that shown in the influence diagram. Extending from
each decision node are branches that represent all possible decision options at
that stage. Each of the decision branches terminates at a random event node rep-
resenting possible mobilization.
The decision nodes are marked dI for the peacetime decision and d2
for the mobilization decision. The random event nodes are labeled M for mobili-
zation and H for hostilities. Extending from each decision node is a branch for
each decision alternative in the sets D, and D2. and from each random event
node are two branches that represent the uncertain outcome. I or 0. The result
values shown at the terminal diamond nodes, and the conditional probabilities
on the branches leaving the M and H nodes, are those defined earlier in this sec-
tion.
2. Note that if overt operations were not considered from the outset we
could remove the directed arcs between d, and both M and H. and from d2
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The notation m and h have been used to represent the probabilities
of mobilization and hostilities occurring respectively. Subscripts are used to dif-
ferentiate between estimated parameters under different policies. The following
probabilities are required:
m. = Pr{mobilization occurs, given no or covert intelligence effort in
peacetime)
= Pr{M=I 1d1=0) = Pr(M=I Idi=1).
M2 = Pr{M= 11 d 1=2).
h, = Pr[hostilities occur, given no intelligence effort in either peace-
time or mobilization)
= Pr(H=l I d1=0, M=l. d2=O}.
h2= PrIhostilities occur, given overt intelligence during mobilization)
= Pr(H=l I M=l. d 2=1}.
These probabilities are attached to the appropriate branches of the decision tree.
4.2 Parameter Ordering Assumptions
From the structure of the problem thus far it is reasonable to make
some assumptions on the relative values of the nmis. hts and r,'s. First we assume
that overt intelligence gathering in peacetime and/or mobilization acts as deter-
rence. It results in a probability of mobilization that is no larger than. and quite
likely smaller than. what it would be if no intelligence were gathered or it was
gathered covertly. This implies that
1111 Ž £112. (7)
Similarly. once mobilization has begun. it is assumed that overt intelligence will
result in lowering (or at least not raising) the likelihood that hostilities break out.
Thus
h 2-. h2. (8)
20
Second we assume that the more information we have the more successful we
will be in reducing the expected number of missiles launched if hostilities break
out. We also assume that the most effective way to reduce this number is to in-
terdict the launchers during mobilization. Thus
rI > r2 Ž r3 a r4 a r5. (9)
These assumptions play an important role in the next subsection.
4.3 Problem Solution
As in solving any decision tree we start at the terminal nodes in
Figure 4. As we work back to the dI node we take expected values at the random
nodes and minima at decision nodes. At the three d2 nodes starting at the top of
the diagram. the expected result for each is Min{hjrj, h2r 2). Min{r5. h2r3 }, and
Minjr 5. h 2r4 ). From the inequalities in (8) and (9) the first of these minima can be
resolved immediately. The optimal policy to pursue if no intelligence is gathered
in peacetime and mobilization occurs. is to start overt intelligence gathering im-
mediately with an expected result equal to h2r 2. Resolution of the other two min-
ima will depend on the relative value of h2, and we look at three cases.
Case 1: (r5/rJ : h2 5 1.
This immediately implies that rs -< h2r4,. and with (9) that rs 5 h2r3 .
This shows us that if intelligence has been gathered in peacetime no matter
whether it be covert or overt, if mobilization occurs the optimal policy for this
case is to interdict the launchers.
Case II: 0 : h2 : (5 /r3).
For this case rr a h 2r3 and rs - har 4. These show us that if intelli-
gence has been gathered in peacetime no matter whether it be covert or overt, if
mobilization occurs the optimal policy for this case is to continue gathering in-
A telligence. but overtly.
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Case III: (r5/r3 ) < h2:5 (r5/r 4).
For this case rr ,< h 2r3 and r5 > h 2r4. These show us that if covert in-
telligence has been gathered in peacetime and mobilization occurs, the optimal
policy for this case is to interdict the launchers. If overt intelligence has been
gathered in peacetime and mobilization occurs, the optimal policy for this case is
to continue overt intelligence.
With the minima resolved at the d2 nodes we can take expectations
at the M nodes and finally find the minimum at the d, node. At the top M node
the expected return is mjh 2r 2. At the other two M nodes it will depend which of
the three cases pertains, so each must be analyzed separately.
Case I: (r5/rj) < h2 <- 1.
At the middle M node the expected payoff is mlr 5 and at the lower
one mn2r5 . At node d I we need to frid
Minjm lh2 r2, mitr5 , ma2rs
Using the inequalities in (7). (8) and (9). ifwe denote by r the minimum expected
result.
r* = m2r5 .
Case 11:0 : h12 (rr,/r 3).
At the middle wid lower M nodes the expectcd payoffs are mnihar
and mlh2r4 respectivcly. We find the minimum of these and i 1hr 2. so that
r' = n1~lig 4.
Case III: (r5/r 3) <_ h2 :5 (rdrr 4).
At the middle and lower M nodes the expected payoffs are ii r! and
mahar4 respectively. We find the minimum of these and nimhara. so that again
r"= iln~har4 .
To summarize the results,
1. In peacetime undertake overt intelligence gathering (di*=2)
2. If mobilization occurs
a. If h2 • (r5/r4), continue overt intelligence until
hostilities occur (d 2 *=1),
b. If h 2 > (r5 /r 4), interdict launchers (d2*=2).
Figure 5 shows these results graphically, together with the expected
result if no action is taken prior to hostilities.
Using "No Intelligence Gathering" Policy
Reduction in expected missiles
reaching target area
m 2r5  r
S In2r4
0 r5/r4 1.0 11
Continue Overt Intelligence Interdict Launchers
Figure 5: Optimal Policies and Expected Payoff Function
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5. Circulation and Decision Model Synthesis
In the decision model in the previous section the payoffs are mea-
sured in expected numbers of missiles launched. Recall that Equation (1) in
Section 3 gives the expected number of missile launched by launcher i. Combin-
ing the notation from Sections 3 and 4, the result measures from the decision
model, (r, through r5) c:an be expressed as
ntl q,•
rj = 1-_ q(J) ' j=1,2,3,4,5. (10)
l-qj q2
where the superscript (j) on the parameters refers to the subscript on r. For ex-
ample, n 11) represents the estimated number of launchers remaining given the
peacetime decision is no effort (d1=0), mobilization occurs (M = 1). the mobiliza-
tion decision is no effort (d2 =0), and hostilities occur (H = 1). It follows that
n -l) = n( 2) = n( 3) =n(4) = n. (11)
as nothing is done prior to hostilities to reduce the number of launchers in these
instances. If the interdiction decision is made we assume that action is taken
agaist launchers on their way from storage to the forward stageing area resulting
in nl-) < n.
It is assumed in this report that more intelligence leads to a reduced
chance of launcher survival during the outbound leg of the cycle. This is ex-
pressed as
1 = a; q, Žq,3) - q q, (12)
Once hostilities start, it is assumed the launcher survival probability qI on the
outbound leg of the cycle is appromimately the amen whether peacetime intelli-
gence is followed by more intelligence, or by interdiction upon threat mobiliza-
tion. Since post-missile-launch counter effort tactics are based oa the flaming
datum, they are assumed to be independent of pre-hostility intelligence effort.
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Therefore, it follows that all return transit launcher survival probabilities would
be equal,
q2(i) =q 2, (13)
for all J.
To determine the optimal policy, Figure 5 in Section 4 shows that
the ratio r5 /r 4 is a critical quantity. Using Equation (1), the ratio can be ex-
pressed as
r n (5) q 5 ( 1 q ( 4 )•q (4 ))
r4 n (4q4) ( )-q (5)q)
n 1 (q 1 q2 )
From (11), (12), and (13) this equation reduces to
r 5  n (5)
.r4 n
which is the estimated fraction of launchers remaining after interdiction. This re-
sult is shown in Figure 6. and can be stated as follows:
Gwen that mobilization has occurred and intelligence is being gath-
ered overtly in this period, if the decision maker assesses the proba-
bility that hostilities will occur to be higher than theftraction of missile
launchers that are expected to survive preemptive interdiction, then
preemptive interdiction of the launchers is the optimal course ofaction.
Perform Intel. Perform Intel. in Peacetime





Figure 6:Optimal PoUcy in Terms of Fraction of Launchers Remaining
2-5
5.1 Intelligence Effort Level
Nothing has been said to this point about the type or level intelli-
gence effort. A detailed discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this report,
but we include some remarks that show the relation between critical model pa-
rameters and resources spent on intelligence gathering.
Figure 7 shows a typical curve of how the fraction of launchers that
survive interdiction during mobilization is reduced by increasing intelligence
gathering efforts. Also shown is a line depicting the effect of deterrence (and a
1 .4 n (5) /n





Continue Overt Intel. Interdict Launchers
Figure 7:Optimal Policies in Terms of Intelligence Effort
dashed line showing no deterrence effect). For intelligence efforts at levels above
this cross-over point the optimal strategy is to interdict launchers duiing mobi-
lization.
The particular shape of the curve and the units used to measure the
intelligence effort cannot be discussed in this report. An obvious unit is man--
hours of effort; another might be surveillance flight hours. The S-shaped curve
shown is typical of what one might expect, indicating little effect from small
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amounts in intelligence effort and little effect from amounts above a certain
threshold. We can say little more at this preliminary stage of modeling.
6. Conclusions
Model construction and assumptions have been designed to approx-
imate reality. The result measure of expected missile launches was selected to
reflect the current political and social attitude towards mobile short range ballis-
tic missiles. Given that they are acceptable to the decision maker, the model gives
valuable insight into the payoff from pre-hostility intelligence effort in reducing
expected missile launches, as well as the construction of optimal policies to
counter a third world weapon system such as the mobile short range ballistic
missile. No point estimates or specific solutions are included in the insight
gained through analysis of the model; rather, regions of preference are stressed.
The plots of expected missile launches enable the decision maker and analyst to
perform relatively simple sensitivity analysis by clearly showing the model pa-
rameters that can be manipulated for each mode of intelligence and how each af-
fects the expected number of missile launches.
A decision model of this nature is not meant to dictate policy. As an
example, should the model reveal that interdiction is the preferred policy. it must
be remembered that this is with respect to the mobile SRBM threat only. This
could be used as one input into higher level strategy planning. By quantifying the
different options available, the input will be based on an informed decision made
by the decision maker and avoid one based solely on past experience or feelings.
7. Future Work
The models presented in this report are clearly basic. The intent is
to introduce the reader interested in countering SRBM's to the ideas of ASW
Search and decision modeling. The result of any real decision problem concern-
ing SRBM's will probably be measured with multiple attributes, not simply ex-
pected missiles launched. Acceptable levels of launches will depend on many
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factors including warhead type (conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear). If
'the curve in Figure 7 can be better defined and quantified, the decision tree in
Figure 4 can include more decision alternatives and/or stages. These might in-
clude multiple levels and methods of intelligence gathering as well as various
types of search methods. Real decision trees tend to become very large, but mod-
em techniques and software are available for their rapid solution and interactive
use on personal computers (Ref. [5]). Some model parameters, such as the prob-
ability that hostilities will break out given a certain course of action, will remain
to be estimated by the decision maker. The power of decision analysis using de-
cision trees and influence diagrams is that it involves the decision maker in the
modelling process; the model acts as a means to show rapidly the (sometimes un-
expected) results of certain actions and assumptions.
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